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Abstract This article draws upon social science literature to offer a new assessment
of the normative value of human rights law vis-a`-vis international humanitarian law
in territory under armed groups’ control. In particular, the article considers how the
two bodies of law can be applied in a complementary manner to regulate the
everyday life of civilians who are not involved in hostilities. The article demon-
strates that while it might be tempting to imagine that concerns relating to rights
such as the freedom of movement, the right to work or protection from common
crime are completely displaced by considerations of physical security and survival
in times of armed conflict, in reality this is often not the case.
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1 Introduction
Although it is now commonplace for human rights accountability mechanisms to
hold armed groups to account under human rights law, the long-running academic
debate about armed groups and human rights law continues.1 Firstly, there is debate
on the question of whether and when armed groups have obligations under human
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rights law.2 Secondly, there is debate about the normative value that human rights
law brings to the legal framework of non-international armed conflicts.3 The
disconnect between law and practice on this issue is troubling and creates an
imperative to find clarity on these questions. An equal need for clarity arises from
the fact that in many different countries of the world today, civilians are living under
the control of armed groups. One only needs to think of high-profile armed groups
such as the Islamic State (IS) to appreciate the reality of this. At the height of its
power in March 2015, the IS was said to have control over 10 million people living
in towns and rural areas in the regions of Syria and Iraq under its control.4 At the
end of 2014, documentary evidence indicated that IS had at least fourteen
government ministries that addressed a wide range of issues such as military and
defence, finance and currency, education, health and natural resources.5 Documents
also indicate that IS has been active in the regulation of a broad range of further
issues relating to everyday life, such as fishing, telephone subscriptions, vaccina-
tions, electricity provision, sanitation services and agriculture.6 The fact that armed
groups like IS are performing governance activities creates a pressing need to
understand the relevance of human rights law to the legal framework that regulates
their actions.
From a legal perspective, the purpose of this article is not to address how and
when it can be legitimately argued that armed groups are bound by human rights
law. This author has shown in a forthcoming longer study that a number of
respectable legal arguments can be employed to explain how armed groups are
bound by human rights law in instances where they control territory. These can be
summarised briefly: first, the law of belligerency and insurgency offers a historical
precedent for third States holding armed groups to be bound by the obligations of
the State, in areas where they take over the functions of government and the de jure
government is absent. Additionally, there are indications that armed groups may be
bound by certain human rights law, via the human rights obligations of the State by
virtue of their control over territory and the default of the de jure government.7
Likewise, armed groups can be said to be bound by some (but not all) human rights
obligations through rules of customary international law to that effect, as
demonstrated by State practice and opinio juris. When armed groups do not control
2 For an introduction to the debate on this question, see, inter alia, Rodley (1993), pp. 297–313; Moir
(2002), p. 45; Clapham (2006), pp. 271–299; Ryngaert (2008); Constantinides (2010); Rodenhauser
(2012).
3 In particular, it has been argued that human rights norms are almost identical to international
humanitarian law norms. See for example, Zegveld (2002), p. 52.




7 See for example Art. 9 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The
text of these Articles and Commentaries are found in the Report of the International Law Commission
2001, Fifty-third session, UN General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No.
10, UN Doc. No. A/56/10. For previous discussions of the application of Art. 9 to armed groups see Ruys
(2007), pp. 285–290; Ryngaert (2008), p. 361; Sivakumaran (2005), p. 551; McCorquodale and La Forgia
(2001), pp. 213–214 and Hessbruegge (2005), pp. 62–63.
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territory, the author has found less weighty historical or legal precedents for the idea
that armed groups are bound by human rights norms. However, as she has
demonstrated in her longer study, a conceptual analysis of the international criminal
law on crimes against humanity indicates that armed groups are bound by the
corresponding underlying norms of human rights law.
The purpose of this article is to examine the second uncertainty relating to the
value of human rights law vis-a`-vis international humanitarian law. After all, if, as
some academics have argued, the application of human rights norms to armed
groups has little normative value vis-a`-vis international humanitarian law, it is
unclear whether the burgeoning practice of human rights accountability mechanisms
is either normatively legitimate or useful. The article addresses this question by
drawing upon the recent surge of literature from the social sciences examining the
reality of life under rebel control.8 One of the most interesting findings in this body
of literature is the observation that armed groups engage in governance activities
more often that it was often thought.9 Another relevant finding is that territory under
rebel control is often characterised by a considerable degree of order and
organisation.10 This observation contradicts previous assumptions that, short of a
few exceptions, territory under rebel control is rarely organised. Social science
literature also notes that people living in territory under rebel control retain a greater
measure of personal agency than is often thought.11 This literature from political
sciences and anthropology is rarely utilised by lawyers. But, as this article will
show, it is an important resource when seeking to evaluate the question of the added
value of human rights law vis-a`-vis international humanitarian law in territory under
rebel control. It demonstrates that while it might be tempting to imagine that rights
such as the freedom of movement, the right to work or protection from common
crime are displaced by more pressing considerations of physical security and
survival in times of armed conflict, in reality this is often not the case.
2 Armed Groups and Governance
When applied to armed groups, the term ‘governance’ has been used to describe
how an insurgent group regulates life within a defined territory and provides public
services to the civilian population. It has been noted that it is hard to find armed
groups who control populated territories that do not establish some form of
government structure.12 Usually the purpose of an armed group’s civilian wing is to
enable the group to regulate its relations with the civilian population. Importantly,
the concept of ‘governance’ is generally seen to be a ‘more encompassing
8 Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015), p. 1.
9 Kasfir (2015), p. 26.
10 Kalyvas (2009), p. 71.
11 Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015), p. 2.
12 Kasfir (2015), p. 26.
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phenomenon than government’.13 In other words, for political scientists, it is
possible to conceive of ‘governance’ without ‘government’.14 Mampilly, in his
influential study on insurgent governments and civilian life, has observed that
governance activities by armed groups cover a range of activities that include the
provision of security, public services such as healthcare and education, the
protection of food supplies, the provision of housing or land, the resolution of civil
disputes, the tackling of social problems such as crime, prostitution, drug abuse or
theft and the regulation of the market.15 When considering this description, it is
clear that there is a significant overlap between the paradigm of ‘law enforcement’
referred to by lawyers and the concept of ‘governance’ referred to by social
scientists. The law enforcement paradigm, as opposed to the conduct of hostilities
paradigm, is a term used by lawyers to describe the factual and legal framework
which applies when individuals or territory fall under the control of one party to an
armed conflict. While there remains some disagreement on the issue, it is a
paradigm which is widely thought to be regulated by international humanitarian law
and international human rights law.16 The obvious overlap between these two
concepts makes it useful for lawyers to consider the literature on governance to find
out how armed groups act in territory under their control.
Literature from political sciences on governance demonstrates that there is often
a surprising degree of order in territory which falls outside the control of the de jure
government.17 All too often in armed conflict analysis, territory outside the State’s
control is assumed to be wracked with Hobbesian chaos.18 However, recent findings
from social scientists conducting research on conflict zones have repeatedly
observed this assumption to be untrue, commenting that ‘everyday life’ in conflict
areas is much more ordered than it is often imagined. Verhoeven recounts how
although to outsiders Somalia resembled a ‘terrifying war zone’, in fact it was a
‘complex mosaic of traditional and imaginative informal mechanisms and pacts
[which] provided a reasonable degree of stability’.19 Indeed, research by political
scientists shows that armed actors are often willing to ‘eliminate common crime’ in
areas under their control.20 Likewise, armed groups often feel forced to develop and
uphold structures for maintaining civilian life.21 This literature provides lawyers
with the important reminder that armed groups may control territory and undertake
law enforcement activities in more circumstances than those contemplated by
13 Mampilly (2011), p. 3 citing Rosenau (1992), p. 12.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 4.
16 See for example Gill (2013), p. 346. See also Melzer (2009), p. 89.
17 See Kolomba Beck (2012), pp. 123–124. See also Ellsberg (2003), p. 114 as cited by Kalyvas (2009),
p. 71.
18 Mampilly (2011), pp. 7, 28, 35 and 40. See also Kalyvas (2009), p. 384.
19 Verhoeven (2009), pp. 411–412 and 414.
20 Kalyvas (2009), p. 70.
21 Mampilly (2011), p. 31.
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Additional Protocol II.22 For example, there may be situations in which an armed
group takes control over a town overnight, and overnight finds itself in control of the
town’s population and already existing prison population. In such instances, an
armed group may take immediate steps to control the town’s population by
instigating curfews, calling public meetings, taking over broadcasting media or
setting up checkpoints.23 An armed group may also immediately start exerting its
authority over the population by punishing alleged collaborators. Similarly, an
armed group may also exercise governance over its own combatants and their
families. For example, if an armed group adopts a nomadic existence or has been
encamped or exiled in a certain geographical location for generations.24
This material suggests that armed groups partake in law enforcement activities in
different, or more nuanced, ways than is often noted in legal literature. The idea that
they do so leads to the connected observation that very few armed groups’
governance activities are State-like in character. Indeed, while legal literature tends
to present law enforcement activities and territorial control in binary terms (i.e.
armed groups are either State-like or non-State-like, territory is either controlled by
the State or the armed group, law enforcement activities are either provided by the
State or the armed group), research from political scientists shows us that the
provision of law enforcement activities by armed groups is a complex phenomenon
that is hard to categorise in absolute terms. For example, it is often commented in
legal literature that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka had a
sophisticated legal system comprising of a complex network of police stations,
district courts and appeal courts.25 However, legal literature does not point out the
nuance that the LTTE never provided health or education services in the territory
under its control.26 Interestingly, these issues remained the responsibility of the Sri
22 Art. 1 of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II), applies to
non-international armed conflicts which take place in a territory of a High Contracting Party between its
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups, which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol.
23 An example of a rebel group controlling a town for a short period in this manner was seen with the
M23 rebel group’s control of Goma in 2013. For relevant news stories see: ‘DR Congo rebels impose
unacceptable curfew, UN’, i24 News, 4 September 2013, http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/
africa/130905-dr-congo-rebels-impose-unacceptable-curfew-un; D. Blair, ‘Goma falls to M23 rebels
without expected bloodbath’, The Telegraph, 20 November 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9691489/Goma-falls-to-Congos-M23-rebels-
without-expected-bloodbath.html. See also the public rally convened by M23 after it took Goma. D. Blair,
‘Congo’s rebel army vows to take control of all DR Congo’, The Telegraph, 21 November 2012, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9693043/
Congos-rebel-army-vows-to-take-control-of-all-DR-Congo.html; Reporters without Borders, ‘TV Sta-
tions Silenced by M23 Resume Retransmitting in Goma’, 4 December 2012, http://en.rsf.org/drc-concern-
about-m23-s-news-control-21-11-2012,43706.html; Human Rights Watch, ‘M23 rebels Rape, Kill
Civilians’, 22 July 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/22/dr-congo-m23-rebels-kill-rape-civilians.
24 See the study of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola by
Kolomba Beck where she recalls how UNITA families were micro-managed by the armed group in bush
encampments. Kolomba Beck (2012), pp. 113–117.
25 See for example Sivakumaran (2009), p. 494.
26 Mampilly (2011), pp. 110–111.
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Lankan State for the duration of the conflict.27 Political science literature repeatedly
demonstrates that governance structures in areas under rebel control are often more
complex than it is often thought, with input from, and alliances between, multiple
players including armed groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious
leaders and the State.28 In a similar vein, although the Forces Nouvelles in the Ivory
Coast had a large prison population under its control for the duration of the period
that it controlled the north of the country, the group did not run a justice system
because the judiciary had fled to the South of the country at the start of the
conflict.29 Again this example shows that an armed group’s decision to provide
public services often responds to a complex set of country-specific factors. These
factors can range from the prior provision of services by the State, the expectations
of the civilian population and brokered agreements between the armed group and
the State.30
Continuing along this theme, political science literature also makes clear that
armed groups do not only perform governance activities as part of their battle for
legitimacy against the incumbent government.31 While in many instances this may
be true, armed groups often provide public services for a variety of different
reasons. Interestingly, as has already been mentioned, armed groups sometimes feel
compelled to provide governance activities. Mampilly notes in his research on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that the vice president of the Rally for
Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) considered the group to be under an
obligation to set up what was ‘more or less a government’ as a consequence of the
control it exerted over the territory.32 A similar view was expressed by the LTTE’s
chief negotiator, Mr Anton Balasingham who stated that the group’s law
enforcement apparatus was a ‘necessity’ for a group exercising control over such
a large area. He stated:
We explained that these courts and police stations have been functional for the
last 12 years and that the ground reality is that as a consequence of this war the
27 Ibid.
28 See for example Barter (2015) on the governance alliances formed between the Free Aceh Movement,
rural Islamic teachers and student activists. See also Arjona (2015) on the concept of ‘aliocracy’, i.e. the
provision of governance by other actors in addition to armed groups, p. 182.
29 D. Balint-Kurti, ‘Cote D’Ivoire’s Forces Nouvelles, Chatham House’, September 2007 Africa
Programme Armed Non-State Actors Series, p. 26. See also Eighteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. No. S/2008/645 and Twenty-fourth
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. No. S/2010/
245 on the restoration of the judiciary and parallel system of administration maintained by the Forces
Nouvelles.
30 See Weinstein (2007) who argues that an armed group with an income stream from abroad or natural
resources will be less reliant upon the civilian population for survival and therefore will be less likely to
create a form of governance that encourages support from the civilian population. See also Mampilly who
argues that the nature of the pre-conflict relationship between State and society, particularly in the area of
service provision, will shape the rebel command’s preferences for civilian governance. Mampilly (2011),
p. 234. See also Kalyvas (2009).
31 Kilcullen (2010), pp. 147–149 sets out that armed groups often adopt governance roles as part of a
battle for legitimacy.
32 Mampilly (2011), p. 190.
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LTTE has established control over 70 % of the area in the northeast. There are
huge populations here and we have to administer them and for the purposes of
maintaining law and order, or rather social order and cohesion we need to have
certain institutions. […] [T]hese police stations are necessary instruments to
maintain law and order because we cannot allow anarchy and social disorder
in areas controlled by us.33
Similar statements have come from officials of the Islamic courts operating in
Syria, under rebel-controlled territory. Marwan Gayad, a former appeals court judge
who defected from the Syrian government and was serving as the general prosecutor
for the United courts Council at the time of his interview in 2012 said ‘we created
this temporary judicial council as an emergency solution, like when a doctor
removes a bullet from a patient without using an anaesthetic’.34
3 The Relevance of Literature on Governance to the Legal Framework
From a legal perspective, the first point to note is that the literature on governance
from political science literature confirms that the law enforcement paradigm is
important in territory under rebel control. It confirms that armed groups exercise
authority over persons or territory, take steps to maintain public order and take
measures to suppress crime or other subversive activities. Importantly, it also
confirms that there is an important role for human rights law, alongside international
humanitarian law within this paradigm. Most significantly the literature from
political scientists and anthropologists on armed conflict confirm a view that there
are significant aspects of people’s lives which are not explicitly connected to the
armed conflict. This literature puts forward the idea that everyday life goes on in
times of armed conflict much more regularly than it is often observed. In a longer
study on the topic of armed groups and human rights law, the present author has
labelled this phenomenon the ‘life goes on driver’. The use of the word ‘driver’ is
intended to capture the idea that the phenomenon of everyday life is a force with an
irrepressible momentum that is partly defined by the armed conflict, but partly exists
outside of the armed conflict in the population itself. In many ways, the ‘life goes on
driver’ is the other side of the governance ‘coin’. It has been shown above that
governance structures are often instituted in response to life going on in territory
under rebel control, but they also constitute important tools which facilitate and
enable life to carry on. In that sense, the ‘life goes on driver’ and the provision of
governance activities by an armed group can be seen as two interdependent and
mutually reinforcing phenomena impacting upon the legal landscape.
33 ‘LTTE police stations ‘‘not a new phenomena’’—Balasingham’, TamilNet, 3 December 2002, http://
www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=7932. A similar sentiment was stated by the vice president
of RCD-Goma in 1998 when it took control in the Kivus. He said: ‘We hadn’t realized that we would
have to set up what is more or less a government so fast, but it’s an obligation now’, BBC Monitoring
1998, as cited by Mampilly (2011), p. 190.
34 I. Watson and R. Razek, ‘Rebel court fills void amid Syrian civil war’, 26 January 2012, http://edition.
cnn.com/2013/01/25/world/meast/syria-rebel-court/.
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Indeed, it is increasingly noted in research emerging from political sciences and
anthropology that the experience of everyday life in times of armed conflict has
been all too often excluded from empirical research. Instead, there has been a
general tendency for an analysis of non-international armed conflicts to be
conducted in a top-down manner, focusing mainly on the identification of the parties
and their motivations.35 As a result, the dominant accounts of armed conflict have
tended to focus on how individuals living in their midst cope with violence as
victims.36 In order to redress this balance, a growing body of researchers have taken
what has been termed a ‘micropolitical’ approach to armed conflict, which focuses
on the social dynamics of daily life.37 A micropolitical approach concentrates on
how individuals and groups utilise formal and informal power structures in order to
achieve their goals within organisations. The research that has emerged from this
bottom-up approach has radically challenged dominant narratives of armed conflict
and adjusted the image of the individual’s role within it. One of the key observations
emerging from micropolitical studies is the idea that individuals retain a large
degree of agency in the midst of armed conflict. In social science literature, the term
‘agency’ refers to an individual’s ability to act independently and to make free
choices.38
The idea that civilians retain a large measure of agency in times of armed conflict
challenges the widespread perception that violence is the only concern of
individuals living in a war zone. It also challenges the dominant narrative of
armed conflict, under which rather than retaining their status as ‘brothers, workers,
neighbours and elders’, individuals are distilled down to reductionist categories such
as ‘‘‘refugees’’, whose only recognizable role is to flee violence, or as ‘‘combatants’’
whose only analysed role is to perpetrate violence, or as ‘‘victims’’, whose only role
of relevance is to suffer violence’.39 Indeed, it is noteworthy that researchers who
take a micropolitical approach repeatedly emphasise that civilians are rarely only
victims.40 Instead, individuals continue pursuing life goals in the midst of the armed
conflict and build life narratives which may be partly defined by the armed conflict,
but which are often also partly independent of the armed conflict.41 In other words,
emerging empirical research challenges the exclusivity of what has been called
‘state of emergency’ thinking in armed conflict, demonstrating a counter image of
everyday life persisting in the midst of that crisis.42 It is important to note that by
identifying the durability of everyday life in the midst of armed conflict, researchers
35 Kalyvas (2009), p. 39.
36 Lubkemann (2010), pp. 11–12 and 21 and Mampilly (2011), p. 6.
37 Kolomba-Beck (2012), pp. 16 and 23 where she defines ‘micropolitical studies’ as those which aim to
‘understand and theoretically construct social processes in wars based on an inquiry into micro-level
dynamics’.
38 Kalyvas (2009), p. 71 and Mampilly (2011), p. 67.
39 Lubkemann (2010), p. 12.
40 Ibid. and Mampilly (2011), p. 67.
41 Kalyvas (2009), p. 390.
42 Kolomba Beck (2012), p. 11.
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do not have the intention of downplaying civilians’ suffering. Instead, their intention
is to highlight the ‘dignity preserved by people who live through war situations’.43
The life goes on phenomenon identified above is particularly important in
protracted armed conflicts where that conflict becomes the normal backdrop of daily
life.44 Here, common crimes will often continue, people will get married, children
will be born, couples will divorce and people will die.45 Wherever possible children
will continue going to school or receiving an education, people will carry on going
to work and taking their goods to market. People will carry on borrowing money,
having disputes with their neighbours, buying and selling commodities and
travelling around the country to the extent to which it is possible. Indeed, empirical
research indicates that the ‘life goes on driver’ is just as much a force to be reckoned
with in territory controlled by armed groups, as in territory controlled by the State.46
It has been commented in this respect that in times of non-international armed
conflict, ‘most people most of the time are interacting in non-violent ways’.47 As a
result, just as social sciences literature shows that territory under rebel control is
usually not as chaotic as it is often thought, it also shows that everyday life under
rebel control is more complicated than simply victimhood and violence.
4 The Life Goes on Driver and Human Rights Law
From a legal perspective, the adjustment of the armed conflict narrative confirms
that individual rights remain significantly important in territory controlled by
armed groups. In the climate of fear and suspicion which often accompanies a non-
international armed conflict, there will be a more pressing imperative than ever to
protect the family unit, privacy, the home and correspondence. Far-reaching
curfews or checkpoints may not only prevent people from moving around but also
prevent them getting to work, transporting their goods or working their land.
Children may be prevented from attending school. Radio and television stations
may be prevented from broadcasting freely, in a manner that constitutes an
interference of the right to freedom of expression. Likewise, people may be
prevented from attending or convening public rallies, in a manner that interferes
43 Ibid., p. 147.
44 ‘Bombardments can’t stop the Disco beat in Aleppo’, Malay Mail Online, 23 November 2014, http://
m.themalaymailonline.com/features/article/bombardments-cant-stop-the-disco-beat-in-aleppo.
45 Commenting on how in the ‘throes of war’ Mozambicans ‘still lived everyday lives, remained social
beings, and pursued key life projects, such as marrying and bearing children’, Lubkemann recalls the
words of an artist in Mozambique when she recalls meeting a pregnant friend in the middle of the armed
conflict: ‘[A]lthough the bloodshed was all around then, you could still find some lovers. They would say
all is gone, but let’s at least love one another to create the future […]. I was joking around one day with a
friend as I often do. I saw she was pregnant and said ‘‘You’re pregnant, but we are in the middle of a
war!’’ And my friend responded, ‘‘Yes, it is war, but even here on the street we still make love’’.’
Lubkemann (2010), p. 217.
46 C. Reuter, ‘Daily Life in Aleppo: The Struggle for Normality amid the Ruins of War’, Spiegel Online,
26 February 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-struggle-to-maintain-order-in-rebel-
controlled-aleppo-in-syria-a-885396.html.
47 Mampilly (2011), p. 7 citing Tilly (2003), p. 12.
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with their right to freedom of association. People may become more susceptible to
abuse by private corporations or employers seeking to exploit the situation of
armed conflict, to impose harsher conditions of work or employment. Common or
violent crime may increase as a result of people living in poverty, suffering trauma
from the conflict or taking advantage of reduced policing. Conversely, authorities
may institute an over-zealous response to common crime that results in arbitrary
detentions, corporal punishment, violations of the right to a fair trial or violations
of the right to life.
It is important to note that many of these issues are not regulated by
international humanitarian law at all or are only minimally dealt with. The reason
for this is that, typically, these are issues which do not relate exclusively to armed
conflict. They are relevant in both times of armed conflict and peace. Notably,
only human rights law can protect people’s ability to work, move around freely,
access healthcare, freely express an opinion, gather in public places and live in an
environment free from common crime.48 Significantly, only human rights law
contains the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of
association.49 Human rights law also contains important provisions on the right to
work, the right to just and favourable conditions of work and the right to an
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing.50 In a
similar vein, only human rights law contains provisions relating to people’s right
to marry freely and a child’s right to be registered at birth.51 Human rights law
also contains many important and detailed provisions relating to the rights of
women, including their right not to be discriminated against in society.52 The fact
that these are issues which are dealt with predominantly by human rights law
serves in part to confirm the conceptual parameters of international human rights
law and international humanitarian law which will be set out below. These are key
rights which are necessary to protect people’s everyday life from unnecessary
interference, and they are all issues addressed principally by human rights law,
rather than international humanitarian law.
5 The Life Goes on Driver and Human Rights Law vis-a`-vis
International Humanitarian Law
The identification of the ‘life goes on driver’ also leads to a related observation
that where both bodies of law deal with similar factual issues, human rights norms
and international humanitarian law norms are in many cases additive. They create
48 See Art. 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which
entered into force on 3 January 1976; Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) which entered into force on 23 March 1976; Art. 12 ICESCR; Art. 19 of the ICCPR; Art. 21 of
the ICCPR and, inter alia, the positive obligations which accompany Arts. 6 and 7 of the ICCPR.
49 See Arts. 19 and 21 of the ICCPR.
50 See Art. 6 and Art. 11 of the ICESCR.
51 See Art. 23(3) and Art. 24(2) of the ICCPR.




a net normative gain, whether they apply simultaneously or alternatively. In
instances where the two bodies of law apply simultaneously to the same issue,
they often approach the issue from a slightly different perspective, meaning that
they contribute to the net value of protection and a single individual can benefit
from both bodies of law simultaneously. For example, while international
humanitarian law prohibits parties to an armed conflict from moving people from
one place to another against their will, human rights law secures their freedom of
movement to move around freely.53 Likewise, while international humanitarian
law secures medical assistance for the ‘wounded’ and ‘sick’, it does not oblige
parties to an armed conflict to provide more generalised medical care to persons
who are not sick.54 However, human rights law contains a provision on the right
to health, in the sense of a positive right that addresses medical needs which are
independent from the armed conflict as such, and extends to healthy people as
well as those who are already sick. Such an independent right is particularly
important for people seeking vaccinations or medical services related to nutrition,
family planning or hygiene.55
The adjustment of the armed conflict narrative is also helpful when considering
how the dividing line should be drawn between the two bodies of law on the few
issues on which international humanitarian law and international human rights law
provide alternative protection in the legal framework, e.g. when the two bodies of
law provide slightly different protections in relation to a single broadly defined
matter. In these instances, the two bodies of law will be ‘alternative’ in that a single
individual will generally fall within either one regime or the other, at any given
moment, but not both. An example of the two regimes existing in an alternative
fashion is seen in issues relating to detention.56 Here, it has been frequently
commented that international humanitarian law and international human rights law
provide different regimes of protection. International humanitarian law protections
are found in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Articles 5 and 6 of
Additional Protocol II. While these provisions provide important protections
relating to the conditions in which a person is kept in detention, they fail to contain
any procedural guarantees preventing arbitrary detention. International human rights
law, on the other hand, provides more detail on procedural matters, in addition to
laying down standards of treatment. Most noteworthy, international human rights
law requires that each instance of detention has a legal basis. For some, the
53 Compare for example Art. 17 of Additional Protocol II prohibiting the forced movement of civilians
with Art. 12 of the ICCPR.
54 Compare for example Art. 7 of Additional Protocol II granting protection for individuals who are sick
and wounded with Art. 12 of the ICESCR.
55 Ibid.
56 Another example is found in the rules on the use of force. Here there is debate about whether
international humanitarian law or human rights law will govern the use of lethal force against an isolated
individual, far from the active hostilities, whose status would allow him or her to be targeted in the
conduct of hostilities paradigm. See for example Sasso`li and Olson (2008) for an examination of the legal
framework relating to killing and detention in non-international armed conflict.
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shortcomings of international humanitarian law on detention issues can be
overcome by resorting to international human rights law.57
Even though it may be possible to fill gaps in the international humanitarian law
framework on detention with human rights law norms, there remain key reasons
why it is important to know whether a person in detention falls primarily under
international humanitarian law or international human rights law. Firstly, it is
important for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates to know
whether a detainee falls under international humanitarian law, as it is the basis of
their visitation mandate.58 Secondly, it is important to know which regime a person
falls under if he or she is mistreated in detention, because it will be the determining
factor of whether a particular act of mistreatment constitutes a war crime.59 A
violation will only constitute a ‘war crime’ if the person is protected by international
humanitarian law. The same can be said when it comes to fair trial rights. Here,
although it is often commented that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and Article 6 of Additional Protocol II can be read in a complementary fashion with
Article 14 of the ICCPR, it remains important to know whether a person who is
prosecuted falls primarily under international humanitarian law or international
human rights law.60 If he or she falls under international humanitarian law, a
violation of his or her fair trial provisions may constitute a war crime under
international criminal law.61
So far, the question of whether individuals fall within the international
humanitarian law or international human rights law framework on issues on which
the two bodies of law provide alternative protection has been mainly discussed in
relation to individuals associated with armed groups, by either taking on the role of
a fighter or directly participating in hostilities.62 Yet there has been less attention
given to the question of which legal norm should apply to civilians who have no
connection to the hostilities. It is shown below that the identification of the idea that
everyday life continues in rebel-held territory is important when determining how
international humanitarian law and international human rights law work together
within the law enforcement paradigm to protect these kinds of civilians. The reason
for this is that there are strong legal arguments to be made that the everyday life of
civilians which has no nexus to the armed conflict is not governed by international
humanitarian law. The fact that international humanitarian law only applies to issues
57 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), pp. 347–352. See also Casalin (2011), p. 746. It has been
pointed out by some academics that human rights law norms on detention are ill-suited to the factual
dynamics of a non-international armed conflict. See for example, Sasso`li and Olson (2008), p. 622.
58 Tuck (2011), p. 773 and Aeschlimann (2005), p. 88. Both of these authors comment on the fact that
while the mandate of the ICRC to visit detainees is derived from international humanitarian law, in
practice the ICRC is often led ‘by extension to concern itself’ with persons deprived of their liberty for
reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.
59 See statement by Prosecutor v. Bosˇkoski and Tarcˇulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 10 July
2008 (Bosˇkoski Trial Chamber Judgment), para. 293.
60 Sivakumaran (2014), pp. 490–491 on the application of the lex specialis criteria and the potential for
human rights law to flesh out fair trial rights in international humanitarian law.
61 See Art. 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
62 See for example Hill-Cawthorne (2015); Sasso`li and Olson (2008); Sasso`li (2011), p. 85.
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with a nexus to the armed conflict is not immediately clear from the wording of
common Article 3 but has been articulated explicitly by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), in decisions relating to jurisdiction. For example, already in the
Tadic´ Jurisdiction Decision, the Appeals Chamber asserted that although interna-
tional humanitarian law applies to the whole country, it does not apply to every act
of violence or instance of detention.63 The need for incidents to have a nexus to the
armed conflict was also confirmed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Akayesu
case which stated ‘common Article 3 requires a close nexus between violations and
the armed conflict’.64
Indeed, a study of Additional Protocol II shows that the text supports the idea that
international humanitarian law norms which form part of the law enforcement
paradigm will only apply to issues with a nexus to the armed conflict. For example,
Article 2, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II states that:
[t]his Protocol shall be applied […] to all persons affected by an armed
conflict defined in Article 1.
Likewise, paragraph 2 of the same article states:
[a]t the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of
their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such
conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been
restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their
liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons,
shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation
or restriction of liberty.
Likewise, Articles 5 and 6 of Additional Protocol II relating to detention and
prosecution state that they apply to ‘persons deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict’ and the ‘prosecution of criminal offences related to
the armed conflict [emphasis added]’. The words ‘related to the armed conflict’
confirm the idea that while international humanitarian law applies to the whole
country in a spatial sense, it does not apply operationally to every issue.
The records of the Geneva Conference which produced Additional Protocol II
demonstrate that its drafters had a strong desire to limit the scope of Additional
Protocol II to issues connected to the armed conflict. They recognised that even in a
non-international armed conflict reaching the threshold of Additional Protocol II,
there might be significant areas of the country and segments of the population who
were not affected by the armed conflict.65 This realisation prompted a long
63 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (Tadic´ Jurisdiction Decision), para. 69. See also Prosecutor v.
Delalic´, Mucic´, Delic´ and Landzˇo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 193:
‘It is axiomatic that not every serious crime committed during the armed conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina can be regarded as a violation of international humanitarian law. There must be an obvious
link between the crime and the armed conflict’.
64 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 444.
65 See ICRC (1987), p. 1360, para. 4490.
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discussion by the Protocols’ drafters about whether the scope of Additional Protocol
II should be limited by geography, i.e. should only apply to part of the country.66
Eventually, however, the drafters of the Additional Protocol came to the conclusion
that it would be more prudent to limit the Protocol’s application by ‘people’ rather
than by ‘place’.67 Hence they confirmed that while the protocol’s provisions apply
in principle to the whole country, they are limited in effect to people ‘affected by an
armed conflict’. Importantly, the inclusion of the phrase ‘affected by an armed
conflict’ in Article 2 also has the effect of limiting the scope of Article 4 of
Additional Protocol II (fundamental guarantees) to persons affected by the armed
conflict. This observation is consistent with the observation above that common
Article 3 only applies to issues with a nexus to the armed conflict. It is also
consistent with the observation that Article 75 (fundamental guarantees) of
Additional Protocol I, which is widely seen as a customary international law
provision applying in non-international armed conflicts, also only applies to issues
with a nexus to the armed conflict.68
The chapeau of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I states that persons will benefit
from the protections of the article ‘in so far as they are affected by a similar situation
referred to in Article 1’.69 The commentary to Article 75 of Additional Protocol I
provides an explanation for the inclusion of these words as follows:
In general those who contravene the normal laws of the State (ordinary
criminals) and who are punished on these grounds, are not ‘affected’ within
the meaning of this article. On the other hand, if security measures are taken
against certain individuals because of their attitude, whether true or alleged,
with regard to the conflict, Article 75 certainly applies to them.70
In other words, the commentary advocates a narrow definition of the term
‘affected by the armed conflict’ which excludes persons who are in the power of a
party to the armed conflict because they have broken the ordinary criminal law.
66 Interestingly, this discussion was along similar lines to the reasoning later found in the Tadic´
Jurisdiction decision. Tadic´ Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 66–70.
67 See also Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974077) Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/
SR.22, p. 211, para. 43 where Mrs Bujard of the ICRC is recorded as explaining that there had been a long
discussion of whether the application of the Additional Protocol should be geographically limited at the
Conference of Government Experts, but the experts had pointed out that in a large, federal State, for
example, it might be better if the Protocol should apply to persons affected by an armed conflict rather
than to the territory where the armed conflict took place. To meet that wish, in its draft the ICRC had not
included an article concerning the territorial scope of the Protocol.
68 See Henckaerts and Doswald Beck (2005), pp. 299–384.
69 The commentary to Art. 75 clarifies that the term ‘affected by’ means ‘touched by or concerned’.
Recognising that to a certain extent ‘all those who find themselves in the territory of […] countries at war’
are affected ‘in some way or another’, it also states that such an expansive definition of the term was
probably not what was meant by the provision. Instead, it advocates that a narrow approach should be
taken to the phrase. It justifies its view on this by pointing to the phrase ‘in so far’, and saying that it
suggests that there will be some people in the country who will not be affected by the armed conflict in




Piecing the above analysis together, it can be seen that the requirement under
international humanitarian law that issues should have a ‘relationship’ with the
armed conflict constitutes an important fault line that runs through the law
enforcement paradigm. Indeed, in many cases, it helps to identify the dividing line
between the conceptual coverage of international humanitarian law, on the one
hand, and international human rights law on the other. Significantly, commenting on
the scope of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, Meron observed that its narrow
scope reflected the fact that its drafters did not intend to ‘revise the entire range of
human rights that would otherwise apply between a government and its people’.71 In
other words, he commented that Article 75 was supposed to complement similar
human rights provisions which would continue to apply regardless of the armed
conflict. In a similar vein, Bothe, in his authoritative commentary to the Additional
Protocols, confirmed that ‘the purpose of the Conference was not to draft a
Convention on Human Rights’.72 The fact that both authors distinguished
international humanitarian law from international human rights law confirms a
view that international humanitarian law is generally the lex specialis for issues
which relate specifically to the armed conflict.73
6 The Nexus Requirement in International Criminal Law as Guidance
Assistance on where the dividing line in the law enforcement framework is placed
can be found in the ICTY’s case law on the ‘nexus’ requirement. The nexus
requirement in international criminal law has not been developed to determine
whether a particular incident is governed by international humanitarian law or not.
Instead, it has been developed to determine whether a particular incident is a ‘war’
crime or domestic crime. The Boskosˇki Trial Chamber stated that:
The nexus requirement serves to distinguish war crimes from purely domestic
crimes and also prevents purely random or isolated criminal occurrences from
being characterised as war crimes.74
However, logically, in order to assess whether a particular act can be a war crime,
the first question that must be answered is whether the crime is a violation of
international humanitarian law. As a result, in developing the nexus test, trial
chambers have implicitly articulated a view on the circumstances in which the laws
of war will apply. In doing so, they have confirmed that international humanitarian
law applies to incidents which are ‘substantially related’ to the theatre of armed
conflict.75 They have also confirmed that the location of a particular incident is not
71 Meron (1983), p. 596.
72 Bothe et al. (1982), p. 460 as cited by Meron (1983), p. 597.
73 See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports
1996, p. 226, at para. 25.
74 Bosˇkoski Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 293.
75 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-A, 23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 12 June 2002
(Kunarac Appeals Judgment), para. 57.
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determinative of whether something is able to fall under international humanitarian
law or whether a particular incident is a war crime. Instead, it is more important to
determine whether the incident was ‘closely related to the hostilities occurring in the
other parts of the territories’.76
7 The Nexus Requirement
The finding that there needs to be a close nexus or close relationship between the
incident and the armed conflict prompts a reflection on what this means in practice.
The Kunarac Appeals Judgment examined the nexus requirement in some detail and
provided the following guidance, stating:
The existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a
substantial part in the perpetrators’ ability to commit [the crime], his decision
to commit [the crime], the manner in which it was committed or the purpose
for which it was committed.77
In other words, according to the Appeals Chamber, the nexus requirement would
be satisfied if it could be proved that an individual acted under the ‘guise of the
armed conflict’.78 While these initial comments seem to define the nexus concept
widely, the Appeals Chamber continued by identifying a number of indicators
which suggest that a particular crime constitutes a ‘war crime’, rather than a
domestic crime. These include:
The fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-
combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact
that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of the military campaign;
and the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the
perpetrator’s official duties.79
These concrete factors suggest that the Appeal Chamber’s criteria are in reality
rather more stringent. They indicate that the nexus test requires more than that the
perpetrator simply took advantage of the breakdown of law and order that may
accompany an armed conflict. Instead, the nexus test seems to pivot on the role of the
perpetrator and the victim, their respective statuses under international humanitarian
law and the relationship of the highlighted act with the military campaign of the party
to which the perpetrator belongs. The correctness of this narrower approach has
subsequently been confirmed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber.80
76 Ibid., para. 60.
77 Kunarac Appeals Judgment, para. 59. See van der Wilt (2012) for a thorough review of the case law
from international criminal tribunals and Dutch courts on the ‘nexus requirement’.
78 Ibid., para. 58.
79 Ibid., para. 59.
80 See Prosecutor v. Rutagana, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Judgment, 26 May 2003, para. 570. See
Gagglioli (2014), pp. 513–517 for a discussion of the nexus requirement in international humanitarian law
and international criminal law.
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8 The Nexus Requirement as a Dividing Line between International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law
Framed in these terms, it can be seen that in State-held territory, civilians arrested
and prosecuted for reasons connected to the armed conflict will generally fall under
the scope of international humanitarian law. In contrast, human rights law will have
a key role to play in providing protection to persons subject to the ordinary criminal
justice system. With respect to common crime, rights such as the right to life, the
right to freedom from arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial will come to the
fore, protecting people accused of crimes without a connection to the armed conflict
(i.e. ‘ordinary criminals’) at every stage of the criminal justice system.81 They apply
to the acts of law enforcement officers as they patrol the streets, govern the
employment of lethal force against individuals with no role in the conflict, the
manner and circumstances in which law enforcement officers arrest and detain
people and the manner in which individuals are prosecuted on criminal charges.82
Likewise, human rights norms play an important role in the promulgation and
enforcement of criminal laws that protect individuals from violence by private
actors. For example, human rights law requires a State to have an effective
legislative framework for prosecuting common crimes.83 It also requires a State to
ensure that the legislative framework is enforced through the investigation and
prosecution of perpetrators and the provision of redress to victims.84 While positive
obligations exist in international humanitarian law too, they do not extend to the
prevention of common crime unless it has a ‘clear nexus’ to the armed conflict.85
However, while the above demarcation between international human rights law
and international humanitarian law has clear merit in territory controlled by States,
it must be questioned whether it should be applied in the same manner in territory
under the control of rebel groups. After all, it is reasonable that an individual
arrested in the capital city for murdering his adulterous partner should not be
accused of a violation of international humanitarian law. Clearly, such an individual
should fall under the provisions of the ordinary criminal law and be protected by the
human rights law norms above that protect people accused of common crime.
Likewise, if there is a violation of the individual’s rights in the process of that
individual’s arrest or trial, it is reasonable that this violation is treated as a human
81 See the commentary to Art. 75 of Additional Protocol I cited above at footnote 69.
82 See in particular the right to life, the right not to be arbitrarily detained and the right to a fair trial.
83 See for example, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria (Application No. 43577/98 and 43579/98),
Judgment, 6 July 2005, para. 96.
84 Ibid.
85 Indeed, Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 contains the same ‘respect and ensure respect’
wording, from which the legal basis of some of the earliest articulations of ‘due diligence’ obligations in
human rights law have emerged. See Velasquez Rodriguez case, Inter-American Court of Human Right,
Judgment, 29 July 1988, paras. 165–172. Adopting the same reasoning as the Inter-American Court in the
international humanitarian law framework, the words ‘ensure respect’ in Art. 1 of the Geneva
Conventions can be argued to place an obligation on both parties to a non-international armed conflict to
prevent private individuals violating common Art. 3 and Additional Protocol II.
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rights violation, rather than a war crime. But in territory under rebel control, the
position is less straightforward because an application of the wider Kunarac
approach leaves room for a variety of responses. For example, should one say that
all incidents that involve an interaction between the rebel group and the civilian
population have a ‘nexus’ to the population?86 After all, the power asserted by an
armed group vis-a`-vis the individual has been acquired as a result of the hostilities.
As a result, in some senses, an armed group is always acting under the ‘guise of the
armed conflict’ in its relations with civilians because its position of authority is
derived from the armed conflict.
To some, the main advantage of casting the conceptual net of international
humanitarian law widely is that international humanitarian law ends up as the
exclusive legal framework in the law enforcement paradigm when applied to armed
groups.87 This approach avoids the need to address armed groups under human
rights law at all, which, for scholars doubting the legitimacy of this practice, may be
an advantage. But such an approach has some important drawbacks. First, it risks
diluting the specificity of international humanitarian law as a regime that is designed
to regulate actions related to the armed conflict. Indeed, taken to an extreme level
where everything that occurs within rebel territory is deemed to have a nexus to the
armed conflict, it could lead to the situation that many ‘private’ crimes taking place
in territory controlled by an armed group are categorised as ‘war crimes’. Most
importantly, such an approach also ignores the explicit wording of Article 5 and
Article 6 of Additional Protocol II which seems to acknowledge, albeit implicitly,
that there are some issues in times of armed conflict which are not connected to the
armed conflict, e.g. people detained for reasons not connected to the armed
conflict.88 Significantly, the sense of retaining some sort of dividing line between
international human rights law and international humanitarian law is also confirmed
by the literature that has been reviewed above on governance and everyday life.
This literature provides clear indications that armed groups often engage in
activities relating to law enforcement in territory under their control, for reasons
which are not explicitly linked to the armed conflict.
The literature reviewed in this article confirms that especially in protracted armed
conflicts, there are persuasive reasons for retaining a similar dividing line in rebel-
held territory between the international humanitarian law framework and the
international human rights law framework, as in State-held territory. Indeed, the
application of narrower Kunarac-type criteria confirms the view of the drafters of
Additional Protocol II that there can be situations within the law enforcement
86 The exploration of this idea was inspired by footnote 16 in Melzer (2009), pp. 142–143 where he states
that ‘while the detention of a common thief in the domestic territory of a party to the conflict would
hardly justify the application of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, this situation would change already if
that same thief were arrested by an occupying power who is exercising its authority for reasons related to
the conflict’.
87 See for example Melzer (2010), p. 43 who advocates that armed groups exercising ‘authority or power
over persons, objects or territory for reasons related to an armed conflict must comply with the law
enforcement paradigm, albeit derived exclusively from international human rights law’.
88 See also Tuck (2011), p. 762, an ICRC employee specialising in detention, who observes that the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the CPN-M in Nepal routinely deprived people of their liberty for reasons related,
and unrelated, to the armed conflict.
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framework in which individuals are arrested, detained and prosecuted in areas under
rebel control for reasons that can legitimately be said to be unconnected to the
armed conflict. Significantly, it also leaves room for the acknowledgement that it is
too simplistic to say that an armed group’s exercise of that authority is always
connected to the military goals of the group. In situations where the exercise of
authority is found to be unconnected to the group’s military strategy, any
mistreatment by members of an armed group during trial or detention will not
constitute a war crime, but instead may be characterised as a human rights violation.
Yet importantly, it also leaves scope for the recognition that there are some armed
groups, like IS, who seem to deliberately integrate the imposition of appalling
conditions of cruelty into their law enforcement activities, as part of their military
strategy.89 In these cases, the application of the narrower Kunarac criteria would
allow an armed group’s brutal approach to the suppression of ordinary crime to be
identified as violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes.
9 Conclusions
In conclusion, it has been shown that there is significant normative merit to the
practice of applying human rights norms to armed groups. While clearly there
remains work to be done on how it can be best operationalised, the article has
identified that the value of human rights law can be particularly profound within the
law enforcement paradigm, where armed groups are exercising control over persons
or territory for protracted periods. Indeed, this article has shown that the
identification of the ‘life goes on driver’ is key to understanding the value of
human rights law within that paradigm. For when one thinks of armed conflict
situations, it may be tempting to imagine that rights such as the freedom of
movement, the right to work or protection from common crime will be displaced by
more pressing considerations of physical security and survival. But when one
examines the empirical research from social science literature, one realises that this
is often not the case. Moreover, it is noteworthy that while international
humanitarian law provides crucial protections to victims of armed conflict, it also
reproduces a narrative of non-international armed conflict where individuals are
portrayed as being either fighters or civilians. It replicates a top-down analysis of
armed conflict, whose starting point is the identification of the parties. While this is
a fundamentally important perspective, the article has shown that human rights law,
which places the individual in the centre of its framework, is well placed to provide
a complementary perspective. It is able to respond to new research emerging from
political science and anthropology which emphasises the multidimensional expe-
riences of armed conflict, in which individuals are not only victims but also
participants in the social fabric of life, with a full measure of agency.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
89 International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arabic Republic, ‘Rule of Terror: Living under
ISIS in Syria’, 14 November 2014, see for example paras. 20, 30.
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